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BYPASSING HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
HOW THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT SET A
DAMAGING PRECEDENT FOR PREGNANT
MINORS SEEKING ABORTION CARE
By: Carlie J Armstrong

"[T}he Legislature has assumed under (the law) that all minors will have a parent or guardian who can give consent.
As this case illustrates, however, that is not always true." - Judge William Connolly 1

I. Introduction
In the realm of women's reproductive health,
controversy abounds. The media and politicians on
both sides are often quick to co-op the issue in order
to incorporate it into broader debates regarding the
scope of governmental interests and morality. Despite
abundant data demonstrating that women who
exercise their right to the full ambit of reproductive
health care come from diverse socio-economic
backgrounds and faiths, 2 the labels assigned to women
seeking such care too often range from judgmental
to offensive. 3 The sheer volume of legislation
regarding women's reproductive health over the past
year demonstrates the lingering contentiousness
surrounding these issues, particularly when it comes
to the right to obtain abortion care. 4 The current
constitutional protections afforded to young women
under the age of eighteen contain numerous loopholes
through which states and activist judges may attempt
to restrict their reproductive health care choices.
As such, young women are especially vulnerable to
outside interference when making decisions about
their own reproductive health care. 5 By analyzing a
case recently before the Nebraska Supreme Court,
this article explores the current status of constitutional
protections for young women seeking abortion care,
particularly as these protections apply to wards of
the state. 6
As discussed infra, the constitutional
protections afforded to pregnant minors are rightly
circumscribed and appear to be shrinking. For a ward
of the state, the options available to a young woman
seeking to obtain an abortion often require her to
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go before a judge and plead her case. 7 As a recent
decision by the Nebraska Supreme Court illustrates,
such proceedings are not immune from bias and
judicial activism. 8 To conform to the requirements
of the United States Supreme Court's opinions on
this issue, states are expected to institute particular
safeguards to avoid allowing a third parties an
"absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" over a young
woman's reproductive choices. 9 However, in practice,
the mechanisms meant to protect vulnerable minors
are failing them.

II. The Petition of Anonymous 5 and Nebraska
Judicial Bypass Law
The sixteen-year-old petitioner, known only
as Anonymous 5, was ten weeks pregnant when she
appeared before the district judge seeking to terminate
her pregnancy. 10 The young woman and her two
younger siblings were removed from their biological
parents' custody in 2011 due to abuse and neglect,
and the Nebraska Department of Health and Human
Services assumed temporary custody. 11 The young
woman and her siblings were eventually placed with
a foster family and the biological parents' parental
and custodial rights were formally terminated in
May 2013. 12 At the time of the hearing, the young
woman was still living with her foster parents but
indicated that she was anxious to move out and
had saved enough money to live on her own after
graduating high school. 13 Furthermore, she stated that
she intended to attend college but was considering
working to financially support herself beforehand. 14

When asked about her reason for seeking an abortion,
Anonymous 5 said that she was unable to financially
support a child and, at sixteen years old, could not
fully meet her maternal responsibilities. 11 She noted
that she had already practically raised her two younger
siblings, as their biological parents were neglectful and
rarely around. 1<'
At her hearing, Anonymous 5 stated that
her concerns about her foster family's disapproval of
her choice to seek an abortion led her to pursue the
judicial bypass option. 17 She feared that revealing the
pregnancy could jeopardize her placement with the
foster family, given their deeply held religious beliefs,
and she felt that they would act punitively toward both
her and her child if she carried the pregnancy to term. 18
When asked whether she would prefer an abortion
to a potential difficult situation in her foster home,
Anonymous 5 answered affirmatively. 19 Additionally,
the young woman confirmed that she had attended
multiple counseling sessions in the process of making
her decision to end the pregnancy, as well as undergone
the necessary physical examinations, including three
ultrasounds. 20 When asked by Judge Peter Bataillon
whether she understood that the abortion would "kill
the child inside of [her]" she answered, "Yes." 21
In 2011, the Nebraska Legislature passed
L690, which stipulates that a minor seeking an abortion
must obtain the notarized consent of a parent or legal
guardian. 22 The law includes a mechanism by which
the court may waive this requirement if it determines
that doing so is in the best interests of the minor. 23 The
law specifically notes that the court must take into
consideration any abuse or neglect when determining
whether or not to grant such a waiver. 24 Additionally,
the Nebraska Administrative Code provides that a
ward of the state seeking to terminate a pregnancy
is not required to obtain consent from her parents
nor the Department of Health and Human Services. 25
The law places the decision squarely on the shoulders
of the pregnant minor, affirming that the decision to
notify her parents is hers alone and the Department
will respect her privacy if she requests it. 26
Despite Anonymous S's precarious foster
placement and her status as a ward of the state, Judge
Bataillon ruled at the bypass hearing that she failed
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she
was sufficiently mature and well informed enough
to make the decision independently of her foster
parents. 27 Furthermore, Judge Bataillon held that
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she did not meet the exception granted for victims
of abuse, since her foster parents were not abusive. 28
In reviewing the case de novo, the Nebraska Supreme
Court upheld Judge Bataillon's decision and rejected
the young woman's argument that, as a ward of the
state, she was not subject to the same requirements
of parental consent as other minors. 29 The Court
dismissed this argument on the grounds that it was
not properly raised in her initial petition for judicial
bypass. 30 With her judicial options exhausted,
Anonymous 5 was left with the option of carrying
the pregnancy to term or requesting consent from
her foster family while possibly jeopardizing the only
stable living arrangements she has had in years.

III. Historical Development of Parental Consent
and the Judicial Bypass Requirement
The United States Supreme Court first
addressed whether the Federal Constitution protected
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its
1973 decision in Roe v. 1.Vtzde. 31 The Court ultimately
determined that the Constitutional right to privacy
protected a woman's choice to end a pregnancy;
however, the Court noted that this right is not absolute
and must consider the state's interest in protecting
prenatal life. 32 To that end, the Court created a
framework in which the state's interest became more
compelling and the woman's expectation of privacy
decreased as the pregnancy progressed. 33 In the first
trimester, the state's only compelling interest involves
the preservation of maternal health. 34 As mortality in
abortion is lower than that for childbirth during the
first trimester, the state's interests are quite limited. 35
However, as the pregnancy continues, the state's
interest becomes increasingly compelling to the point
of viability, at which time a woman may only obtain
an abortion if her life or health is at risk. 36
Three years after Roe, the Court reviewed
the issue of parental consent for the first time. In

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
the Court examined a Missouri statute that required
a parent or guardian to provide consent before an
unmarried minor could obtain an abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy. 37 The Court held that
without an alternative legal mechanism by which to
obtain consent (judicial bypass), such a law amounted
to giving a "third party an absolute, and possibly
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arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and
his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy." 38 In
discussing the rights of pregnant minors, the Court
reasoned that constitutional protections do not only
take effect after the age of majority and, as such, minors
must not be deprived of their liberty interests. 39
While the Court's holding in Danforth
established the requirement of judicial bypass for
minors seeking an abortion, the Court did not specify
on what grounds a judge should grant such a petition
in the absence of parental consent. 40 The Court was
called upon to clarify this issue in Bellotti v. Baird. 41
Like Danforth, the case at issue involved a state statute;
however, in this instance the law already contained
a judicial bypass notwithstanding for "good cause
shown." 42 Although the term "good cause shown" was
intended to mean "in the best interests of the minor,''
the Court still found the law unconstitutional as it
required the pregnant minor to request parental
consent prior to seeking a judicial bypass. 43 This rule
effectively would result in parental notification in
all instances, which the Court found unacceptable
without an exception for cases in which notice would
not be in the minor's best interest. 44 Furthermore, the
Court specified that the state law could not allow a
judge to veto an abortion petition if the minor could
prove her ability to give informed consent on the basis
of her maturity. 4s Finally, the law's failure to stipulate
that parents could only refuse consent in the best
interest of the minor was unacceptable. 46 The Court
also expounded on the Constitution's application to
minors and noted that the rights of minors could
not be compared to those of adults.47 The distinction
between the rights of adults and those of children was
justified on the grounds that children are particularly
vulnerable, they are unable to make informed and
mature decisions, and parents maintain an important
guiding role in raising their children. 48
Although Bellotti upheld a minor's right
to judicial bypass, the factors a judge must assess
in granting an abortion have proven vulnerable to
subjectivity. The Court held that to avoid imposing
an undue burden on a minor seeking an abortion,
she may be granted a bypass to make an independent
choice if she can demonstrate that she is sufficiently
mature and well informed. 49 If the minor fails to
convince the court of her maturity, the court may
still permit the procedure to go forward if the minor
can effectively show that the abortion is in her best
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interests.so Additionally, all such bypass proceedings,
including appeals, must maintain the anonymity of
the minor and must be conducted in an expeditious
manner so as not to foreclose the option of abortion.s 1
The Court in Bellotti emphasized that a state may not
interpose its interests between a minor and her right
to a decision from an independent court.s 2
In 1992, the Court abandoned the trimester
framework established in Roe and adopted the undue
burden test.s 3 The Court held that state statutes
would be found invalid if their purpose was to place
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
to abort a nonviable fetus.s 4 The Court determined
that the means employed by the state to protect
the life of the fetus could not encumber the liberty
interests of the woman.ss In the opinion, the Court
noted that the new standard did not shield a woman
from outside interference in her decision. 56 As long
as her ability to choose was preserved, a state could
adopt measures intended to persuade her not to have
an abortion.s 7 In its decision, the Court also upheld
the state's parental consent law because it included a
judicial bypass in keeping with the rule in Bellotti.SB

IY. Subjectivity and Judicial Activism
As the basis for the Nebraska Supreme
Court's denial of Anonymous 5's petition, the
maturity standard merits closer examination. Bellotti
established the standard, yet the Court refrained
from creating specific guidelines for courts to
utilize in making these determinations.s 9 Although
thirty-nine states require parental involvement in a
minor's decision to have an abortion, 60 no state has
enacted legislation creating guidelines for a court in
establishing a minor's "maturity." 61 As a result, great
variation exists among state courts in determining
which factors carry the most weight when deciding
whether a minor is sufficiently mature. 62 Courts are
likely to consider the minor's age, intellect, academic
performance, and financial independence, but other
considerations may come in if the judge finds them
relevant. 63 In practice, the lack of cohesive standards
means that pregnant minors are ultimately at the
mercy of each individual judge's discretion. 64 Such
circumstances raise concerns about the personal
biases of the judges impacting their decisions in these
cases. 6s Whether intentionally or innocently, a judge
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may incorrectly consider the minor's socio-economic
status, race, religion, or make a decision based upon
his or her own religious beliefs. 66 Without a clear
standard by which to gauge these judicial decisions,
biased determinations will likely go unchecked.
In appealing the district court's judgment
against her, Anonymous S argued that Judge
Bataillon's question regarding "killing the child
inside [her]" revealed his lack of impartiality and she
contended that he should have recused himself. 67 The
Nebraska Supreme Court gave her argument littleto-no consideration, dismissing the claim in a short
paragraph on procedural grounds; 68 however, in light
ofJudge Bataillon's professional history, such concerns
are not unfounded. While practicing as a private
attorney in the 1990s, Judge Bataillon defended
seventeen members of Operation Rescue accused of
trespassing on the property of an abortion clinic. 69
Operation Rescue is a right-wing, anti-abortion
organization that has been associated with violence
against physicians who provide abortion care. 70
Furthermore, a few years later, he defended an antiabortion activist accused of stalking and threatening
an abortion provider. 71 With this information in
mind, Judge Bataillon's question to Anonymous S
seems less innocuous than the Nebraska Supreme
Court implied.
The United States Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of a pregnant minor's
right to an independent judicial determination in its
decision in Bellotti. 72 Without such a determination,
the Court expressed the concern that pregnant minors
could be refused abortions by their parents or legal
guardians for arbitrary reasons that were not in the
minors' best interests. 73 Unfortunately, the Court's
ambiguity regarding what it meant by "mature" left
the door open for capricious decisions at the judicial
level. The relevant Nebraska state law specifies that
during judicial bypass hearings, the court will "hear
evidence relating to the emotional development,
maturity, intellect, and understanding of the pregnant
woman." 74 Furthermore, the state explains that the
burden to show maturity rests exclusively with the
pregnant woman and it "is not solely a matter of social
skills, level of intelligence, or verbal skills, but, more
importantly, a matter of experience, perspective, and
judgment. "75
In Anonymous S's case, the Nebraska
Supreme Court did not identify exactly what factors,
SPRI~G
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in its estimation, rendered the young woman so
immature as to be incapable of making an informed
decision. 76 Instead, the court noted that it placed
particular emphasis on her rone, analytic ability,
expressions, composure, and her ability to articulate her
reasoning. 77 Furthermore, the court stated that since
these factors could not be established from the record,
it gave weight to Judge Bataillon's determination
of her immaturity. 78 As such, the court focused
heavily on the wording of her responses to particular
questions and looked for any inconsistencies, some as
inconsequential as her inability to remember whether
she attended five or six counseling sessions. 79 In its
discussion, the court outlined many of the particulars
of Anonymous S's situation that could be relevant in
establishing her maturity. The court observed that
she was nearly seventeen years old, enrolled in high
school, and intended to graduate a semester early
and attend college. 80 The court conceded that the
petitioner had saved enough money to live on her
own, but it elected to focus on her current financial
dependence .on her foster parents as evidence of her
financial immaturity. 81 The court also highlighted her
lack of work experience but subsequently stated that
it is not unusual for unemancipated minors to have
little experience before moving away from home. 82
In the course of the decision, the Nebraska
Supreme Court engaged in a back-and-forth analysis
of Anonymous S's situation while not revealing
upon which factors it would ultimately make its
ruling. 83 The court placed particular significance on
Anonymous S's failure to discuss her understanding
of the potential emotional and psychological
consequences of the procedure. 84 However, the court
seemed to give little credence to the fact that the young
woman had attended numerous counseling sessions
prior to making her decision. 85 The court never
explains why the young woman's age, status as a high
school senior, and previous experience raising her two
younger siblings carried so little weight in assessing
her maturity. 86 Instead, an inexplicable amount of
attention is given to her manner of speech. 87 The
court's decision to give so much weight to this factor is
particularly concerning since it makes no allowance for
the normal nervousness that accompanies appearances
before a court. 88 For young women seeking a judicial
bypass, the experience of appearing before a judge
often generates feelings of fear and tension, as well
as a sense of shame and anxiousness. 89 The Nebraska

13

Supreme Court seemingly took no notice of this
reality when it assessed Anonymous 5's responses.
Given Judge Bataillon's previous professional
involvement in the pro-life movement, the Nebraska
Supreme Court's deference to his determination of
Anonymous 5's maturity calls into question the value
of such a de novo review. The Court sought to limit the
imposition of a judge's personal set of beliefs upon a
pregnant minor in Bellotti; however, as articulated by
Justice Stewart in his concurrence, the "best interest"
standard "provides little real guidance to the judge,
and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and
societal values and mores whose enforcement upon
the minor-particularly when contrary to her own
informed and reasonable decision-is fundamentally
at odds with privacy interests underlying the
constitutional protection afforded to her decision. "90
Justice Stewart's concern is further compounded
by the fact that in instances wherein the minor is
a ward of the state, the judicial bypass process may
present her sole option for obtaining an abortion. 91
In Anonymous 5's case, the court's slight discussion of
relevant factors regarding her maturity92 (e.g., her age,
her numerous counseling sessions, and her tenuous
living situation) lend credence to Justice Stewart's
fears that the personal beliefs of the trial judge may
supplant a young woman's constitutional right to seek
an abortion.

V. Not an Effective Avenue of Relief for Those
Who Need it Most
Although the Court m Bellotti specified
that minors do not enjoy the same constitutional
rights as adults, the rationale for the distinction
largely stemmed from recognition of the inherent
vulnerability of minors. 93 Additionally, the decision
to carry to term or end a pregnancy is unique and
cannot be equated with other situations in which
minors' rights are restricted. 94 The Court observed
that "there are few situations in which denying a
minor the right to make an important decision
will have consequences so grave and indelible. " 95
Depending on her background, maturity, and
financial situation, "unwanted motherhood may be
exceptionally burdensome for a minor" by thrusting
her into the adult world with all of the responsibilities
that her loss of legal minority entails. 96
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Pregnant mmors m foster care face an
additional level of vulnerability given their oftenunstable living situations and lack of parental support.
Young women living in foster homes are more than
twice as likely to become pregnant before the age of
nineteen than their peers who are not in foster care. 97
Little data exists regarding national pregnancy rates
and sexual activity among this population; however,
certain risk factors render young women in foster care
more likely to engage in early sexual activity. 98 Several
studies on teen sexuality revealed that young people
who have close relationships with their parents and
live at home are more likely to delay sexual activity
and demonstrate higher rates of contraception use
when they do become sexually active. 99 Research
suggests that young women in foster care may not be
as motivated as their peers to prevent pregnancy, as
they perceive a baby as an opportunity to create the
family they never had. 10 Furthermore, social workers
in the foster care system are often overwhelmed
by the number of clients and do not have the time
or resources to coach teens on safe sex. 101 Foster
parents are also unlikely to feel comfortable discussing
these issues with children only temporarily placed in
their care. 102
With an estimated 160,000 adolescents
living in foster care or with a relative other than
their biological parents, 103 the Nebraska Supreme
Court's decision becomes increasingly worrisome. As
Judge Connolly stated in his dissent, Anonymous 5
"is in a legal limbo-a quandary of the Legislature's
making." 104 Of primary importance in this situation
is the nonexistence of a legal guardian aside from
the Nebraska Department of Health and Human
Services. 105 Nowhere in the Nebraska Supreme Court's
majority opinion is this reality acknowledged. The
court accepts Judge Bataillon's erroneous suggestion 106
that the minor seek the consent of her foster parents,
despite the young woman's correct assertion that
her foster parents do not have the legal authority to
make such medical decisions, even if they wished
to do so. 107 The Department of Health and Human
Services delegates to foster parents only routine
immunizations and medical care, nothing more. 108
When the young woman and her attorney raised this
issue to the court, it was quickly dismissed as "outside
the scope of [the] special statutory proceeding." 109
Without the consent of the Department of
Health and Human Services, the Nebraska Supreme
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Court placed Anonymous 5 in an impossible
situation. As explained by Judge Connolly in his
dissent, the relevant state statute regarding judicial
bypass specifically applies to a pregnant woman
who "elects not to obtain the consent of her parents
or guardians." 110 Judge Connolly contended that
Anonymous 5 could not possibly elect to bypass
consent as she lacked any legal guardian to grant
consent. 111 A minor's decision to circumvent
obtaining her parents' consent is a prerequisite for
the court to hear such cases. 112 In Judge Connolly's
estimation, a case lacking that component deprives
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and,
as such, the court lacks the authority to hear that
particular question and grant the requested relief. 111
The judicial quagmire created by the district
court and upheld by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
the case of Anonymous 5 has dangerous implications
for minors in foster care. The United States Supreme
Court emphasized in Bellotti that requiring a minor
to first seek parental consent before having access
to judicial bypass failed to "provide an effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the
most." 114 Regrettably, it is now the judicial bypass
procedure itself that threatens to deprive pregnant
minors from obtaining effective relief. Despite the
petitioner and her attorney raising the absence of
parental guardianship issue at trial, the Nebraska
Supreme Court refused to examine the issue further
because Anonymous 5's original petition for judicial
bypass did not address this specific concern. 115
However, nowhere on the judicial bypass form could
Anonymous 5 have indicated her concerns regarding
the jurisdictional issues relating to the Department of
Health and Human Service's status as her guardian. 116
As noted by Judge Connolly, the form is intended
to be easily navigable by minors and, therefore, is a
series of blanks and boxes to check. 117 As such, the
Nebraska Supreme Court's failure to reexamine the
status of the petitioner's guardianship deprived her of
an effective avenue of relief.

minor's constitutional right to bodily autonomy.
While the particular circumstances of this case are
unlikely to be reproduced in many judicial bypass
cases, the large number of young women in foster
care suggests that Anonymous 5 's experience may not
be exceptional. Unfortunately, young women in such
circumstances are incredibly vulnerable and already
face many obstacles to obtaining an education,
escaping poverty, and keeping themselves safe from
abusive or neglectful guardians. 118
The United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that a pregnant minor has a
constitutional right to an independent judicial
determination on whether she is sufficiently mature
to decide for herself to terminate her pregnancy or
whether the abortion would still be in her best interests
despite her immaturity. The case of Anonymous 5
reveals that the protections available to pregnant
minors are inadequate. While the Court may have
stymied parental interference, not enough safeguards
exist to protect these young women from judicial
activism on this already contentious issue. As Judge
Connolly's dissent highlights, the Nebraska Supreme
Court incorrectly assumed the existence of parents
to give consent in such cases, which is sadly not the
reality for wards of the state. Unfortunately, it appears
that the United States Supreme Court similarly erred
when it made the damaging assumption that judges
would set aside their personal biases and act in the
best interests of the minor.

VI. Conclusion
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